Introduction
This chapter examines the developing governance of the third pillar and how the justice and home affairs (JHA) dimension of European Union (EU) external relations has been affected by the events of September 11 th 2001. The EU's legal and strategic policy frameworks for integration in JHA had already been established, respectively within the Treaty of Amsterdam and at the Tempere European Council (European Council 1999) , however these were substantially unrealised despite a number of innovations that sought to overcome the limits of governance within JHA cooperation (Norman, 1999) . The innovations included greater strategic continuity for the multiannual planning of work programmes but also the development of meso level policy communities within and outside the EU, to implement to the strategic objectives of the European Council (and the Group of Eight) particularly in action against 'organised crime'. But the participation of the EU in the 'war on terrorism' in the aftermath of September 11 th , and the consequent elevation of counter terrorism as a 'major policy objective', proved to be a significant turning point for comprehensive attainment of the EU internal security objectives and its projection externally.
The EU's 'roadmap' against terrorism agreed in the aftermath of September 11 th was ambitious. Internally, the EU and its Member States launched a significant programme to realise a diverse range of criminal police and judicial policy initiatives, operational action and institution building with political agreement on contentious issues such as the abolition of extradition and the establishment of the judicial cooperation agency EuroJust. The speed and cross pillar breadth of this response following the attacks was remarkable given the discontinuous pattern of crises and institutional inertia that had characterised EU JHA cooperation since its inception (Norman, 1999) . However, more than this, den Boer and Monar also highlight that 'September 11 must be regarded as the first truly 'cross pillar' test of the Union's role as a security actor ' (2002, p. 11) . Therefore September 11 th provided an opportunity to the EU for radical action to implement strategic objectives in the field of criminal police and judicial cooperation, in the name of counter terrorism, but extending into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and with a more structured deployment of external relations instruments to support achievement of JHA policy objectives. This second focus, on the field of JHA action in the EU's 'external relations' in relation to third states, will be examined in relation to the United States (USA) and Russia.
The reinvigoration of the external relations dimension of JHA highlighted, albeit obliquely, one of the main limitations of EU JHA cooperation up to that point -a heavy focus upon the internal security of the Union and the challenge of ten new entrants in 2004 (Monar, 2000) . Tackling international and transnational offending, whatever its form, requires a broad scope of action, and one not hindered by the policy silos of specific Councils of Ministers. As will be seen below, EU counterterrorism has required Council, 2004) , with a recognition that despite the internal and external rancour over the invasion of Iraq the threat was not just 'out there' and that concrete sustained action was still required to implement political agreements and undertakings.
Therefore to provide a broad overview of governance in the third pillar this chapter will examine the EU's third pillar, but in relation to both counter terrorism and external relations. (Statewatch, 1996) , and its ideological predilections against the European Court of Justice (Duff, 1997, pp. 186-187) . It was widely seen that a flawed system of JHA Crime facilitated by the UK's concurrent Presidency of both the EU and the G8 (Norman, 1999, pp. 110-14; Wrench, 1997) . Focusing on 'transnational organised crime', and later 'cyber crime', the resulting overlapping networks of state actors 'possessing specialist skills and expertise' empowered within the transnational context of EU G8 (Norman, 2001; . Remarkably, some of the EU 'working methods' during this interregnum entailed tabling G8 agreements at JHA Councils for adoption once again bypassing the third pillar policymaking processes entirely (Ibid., 113).
The move from the formal intergovernmentalism of the original third pillar, to a reliance on non treaty based mechanisms designed to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of the JHA policy domain, thereby increased its 'output legitimacy' (Horeth, 8 1999, p. 251 ) but also had a clear transnational impact. The EU's growing orientation towards globalised crime concerns keyed into the TransAtlantic Partnerships with the USA and Canada, to the G8 and to a lesser extent the Council of Europe (Norman, 1999, pp. 114-17) . This period, mediated by the Irish then UK Presidencies, was the precursor to the development of a more systematic and gradated network of transnational relationships that moved from informality to more a formal basis with a (Curtin, 1993, p. 27; O'Keefe, 1995, pp. 895-7) . This 'omission', rectified in the Constitution for Europe, had placed greater responsibilities upon the rotating Presidency, most particularly in the phase prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam when the Commission had limited powers of legislative initiative (excluding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and customs cooperation, TEU, Art. K.2). Elsewhere it has been argued that this 'depoliticised' and thereby facilitated EU action but at some cost to transparency and accountability (Norman, 1999, pp. 106-10) 
United States of America
The basis for cooperation with the USA is the EU's 'Transatlantic Dialogue' under the provisions of the 1996 New Transatlantic Agenda and accompanying Action Plan (EU USA, 1995; 1996, pp. 7-8 & pp. 23-26) . Since then, six monthly EU US Summits have provided the focal point cooperation with ministerial and official meetings taking forward the JHA agenda. In the criminal policing field this contact has principally concerned organised crime and the coordination of the substantial work programme in this area within the G8 (Norman, 1999) . Since September 11 extending to all forms of serious crime for non personal, but also personal data in December 2002 (Peers, 2003 . In the judicial sphere, agreements based on Article 38 of the TEU on extradition and mutual legal assistance, the first of its kind in the JHA field, were again extended beyond terrorism to serious crime in general (Statewatch, 2002) .
The legal agreements were widely regarded as controversial given the death penalty in the USA but was again envisaged at Tempere (European Council, 1999, para. 60) . By
June 2003 negotiations had been completed and detailed work is now being undertaken to implement these agreements (Council of the EU, 2004a, p. 19) . Tempere the practical political realisation and institutional infrastructure to support the longevity of strategic alliances is now being constructed. This change has also seen JHA develop into a genuine cross pillar endeavour spurred by the counter terrorism policy and institutional development and the increased transnational soft security role and responsibilities of the EU's foreign policy coordinator.
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The progressive realisation of the JHA External Relations vision has also increased the importance of technocratic policy groups vis-a-vis parliamentary settings, and in particular at the national level in relation to JHA. Institution building, as has been seen after September 11 th with EuroJust, now requires no national ratification procedures, in stark contrast to the genesis of Europol in the 1990s. Multiannual strategic planning now provides long term continuity and impetus between Presidencies -key in JHA -but also limits intrusion of oversight, debate and accountability over this increasingly important transnational policy domain. Whilst the benefits of international cooperation in JHA can now be increasingly realised in advance of the European Constitution, it is also clear that the EU and its Member States need to realise the benefits of enhanced democratic accountability not only within an expnded Union, but also in its transnational engagements in the name of EU External Relations and counterterrorism.
